Abstract
Introduction "It's about connecting every part of America to the digital age."
Barrack Obama, President, United States of America.
1
All over the world, businesses and governments are expanding the provision of services through the Internet. However, anyone who has visited or called an airline, bank, or government agency will have experienced the corollary. Businesses and governments are aggressively steering clients away from counter and telephone services.
In 2011, the state of Florida enacted a law that required application for unemployment benefit through the Internet, an online skills test, and regular reports on search for work.
Florida Legal Services criticized the law as: "blocking workers from accessing help they are qualified for and twisting the knife in the state's ailing economy" (Miami Herald, May 24, 2012) . The government of Hong Kong provides the elderly with health care vouchers, but only through physicians who join the government's eHealth system.
2 Only 34% of medical practitioners had joined (Government of Hong Kong 2011) . The airline, Lufthansa, charges
American customers US$20 less for bookings through its website than for bookings through its call centre. Its British call centre does not provide toll-free access, and instead charges 10 pence a minute for incoming calls.
Before businesses and governments completely migrate services to the Internet, they should consider how consumers will be affected. How many unemployed Floridans have been excluded from unemployment benefit by not being able to complete the online skills test This self-selection may bias the reported benefit of migration, enjoyed mostly by sophisticated consumers, upward. Indeed, previous research has often recorded a significant advantage to consumers switching to digital services (e.g., Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Fairlie 2006; Jensen 2007; DiMaggio and Bonikowski 2008) .
Accordingly, the significant benefit of migrating to digital services as estimated in previous studies may not apply to a compulsory migration, such as Florida's law on unemployment benefit. With compulsory migration, the less sophisticated consumers might possibly suffer losses, including, at the extreme, complete exclusion from service.
To identify and quantify such losses, we need to compare the outcomes in a setting where a service is accessible only by digital means against an otherwise identical setting where the same service is accessible either by conventional means only, or by both conventional and digital means. For management practice and public policy, it is important to identify the people who would be excluded by migration to a digital platform. Managers need to know the loss of demand, while policy-makers need to know the loss of consumer welfare. However, previous research has mostly studied the complementary configuration -comparing the outcomes with conventional access vis-à-vis with both conventional and digital access (e.g., Hubbard 2003; Jensen 2007; Aron et al. 2011 ). Further, many previous studies were cross-sectional, and some relied on surveys of perceptions and intentions (e.g., Jennings and Zeitner 2003; Wei et al. 2011; Zablah et al. 2012) . So, statistical inference would be sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity, omission of relevant variables, and other forms of endogeneity.
Here, we exploit a natural experiment in the administration of a service that was available only through the Internet for an exogenous period of time in specific exogenous geographical regions. In other time periods and geographical regions, the same service was available through both the Internet and telephone. register by calling a tollfree line. From July 7 onward, all people could register through the tollfree line. 3 This difference in the treatment of people living in the east and west, and before and after the first ten days, provides a unique opportunity to precisely identify the causal effect of lacking telephone access on actual consumer choices (not perceptions or intentions) of whether to register for DNC.
To minimize the possibility that any difference in number of DNC registration was due solely to different availability of service platforms rather than other unobserved demographic characteristics or preferences, we applied a regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux 2010) , using only the counties immediately east and west of the Mississippi 3 Varian et al. (2004) highlighted this administrative difference.
River, on top of a difference (tollfree vis-à-vis no tollfree access)-in-differences (other regional or demographics characteristics) test.
We found robust evidence of a "digital divide". In the first 10 days, registrations were 0.031 per household or 27% lower among consumers in areas without tollfree telephone registration. Once tollfree registration became available, the majority of the registrations lost in the first 10 days were recovered, but 0.04 per household or 3.5% were never made up and were permanently lost. The lost customers were concentrated among the elderly and households lacking Internet access.
We interpret our results as suggesting that migration of any service to the Internet coupled with discontinuation of conventional access would result in a maximum 27% loss of customers. Considering that 39% of households lacked Internet access, a substantial segment of consumers were able to use services through the Internet despite not having access at home.
This suggests that discontinuation of conventional access would have a smaller impact on consumers than suggested by statistics on Internet access.
Related literature
This study is related to two streams of research. The first stream broadly considered how the use of a new technology affected user welfare. The technologies studied included on-board computer systems in the trucking industry (Hubbard 2003) , mobile phone service (Jensen 2007) , automated medical systems (Aron et al. 2011) , and customer relationship management systems (Zablah 2012) . Most studies concluded that the new technologies provided significant benefit to users, with the magnitudes up to the billions of dollars (Hubbard 2003 (Arora et al. 2010; Dewan et al. 2010) , social interaction (Agarwal et al. 2009 ), cultural and social capital (Hsieh et al. 2010) , and the development of Internet content (Viard and Economides 2011 ).
Higher access rates, however, do not imply higher usage. Goldfarb and Prince (2008) analyzed a survey of 18,439 Americans in December 2001. Respondents with higher income and more education were more likely to have Internet access, but, conditional on access, those with lower income and less education spent more time online because they had lower opportunity cost of leisure time. 5 More generally, other than access and leisure time, the use of digital services also depends on capability -i.e., whether consumers have the skills to exploit the new technology (Dewan and Riggins 2005; Wei et al. 2011 endogenous. 6 For example, Forman (2005) found that investments in client/server networking applications may impede Internet adoption, which suggests that some people may use a conventional service because they obtain little benefit from the new digital services.
Hence, disparities in access and usage of digital services in the continuing presence of older alternatives may not give an accurate assessment of the disadvantages faced by non-users.
To gauge such disadvantages, the technologies made available to consumers must be exogenous. This study adopts such a design in a natural setting, the U.S. DNC registry.
Finally, a small stream of digital divide research studies the disparities in economic and social outcomes, which is what managers and policy-makers ultimately care about. In a survey of 4,603 students across 26 schools in Singapore, Wei et al. (2011) inferred that school IT training and facilities helped students without home computers to improve their (self-reported) computer skills but not their level of education in general. Using differencein-differences analysis, Jensen (2007) studied the impact of mobile telephone service among fishermen and wholesalers in the state of Kerala, India, over the period 1997-2001.
Comparing change in outcomes in regions with and without mobile telephone service, adoption of mobile service was associated with a sharp reduction in price dispersion, elimination of unsold catches, and increases in both consumer and producer welfare. While these studies identified the benefit of the new technologies to users (by comparing the outcomes with the conventional technologies against the outcomes with both conventional and new technologies), they could not gauge the losses, if any, to non-users. Identifying such losses, and who incur the losses, is the key objective of our study.
U.S. Do Not Call Registry
The FTC contracted with AT&T Government Solutions to administer the DNC registry (Federal Trade Commission 2003a Figure 1 depicts the division of the country by registration method in the first 10 days, from June 27 to July 6.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The FTC has not disclosed how it decided which area received priority in tollfree registration. 8 To the extent that the FTC gave priority to the states whose residents were less
Internet capable, the difference in registration between states with and without tollfree access should be smaller. So, the FTC's choice, if deliberate, should bias against finding any effect of having only Internet registration.
The DNC webpage provides space to register up to three telephone numbers. The consumer must submit the numbers, wait for a confirmation email for each number, and then click on the confirmation to complete the registration. The DNC webpage cautions, "You should register only your own telephone numbers." However, we have not seen any evidence that the authorities took action to enforce against anyone who registered for others.
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The tollfree service allows registration of only one number -that from which the call is placed. The service uses Automatic Number Identification to recognize the number and then prompts the caller to confirm and complete the registration.
7 Contract clause C-S.2.1.2 specified that the FTC would give AT&T at least ten days notice of the opening of tollfree registration in any particular region (FTC 2003a registrations started high on day 1, peaked on days 2-4, and then declined thereafter.
Apparently, consumers in the west were faster in registering than those in the east (the registration rates were higher there in the first few days), which could be due to the earlier availability of tollfree registration. Interestingly, there was a small spike on day 11, possibly because people in counties west of the Mississippi were influenced by publicity in counties east of the Mississippi when tollfree registration became available in the east.
[Insert Figure 4 here] Note that, by comparing Figures 3 and 4 , other than the sharp difference in registration rates on days 11-15 (when tollfree registration was opened in the east), the pattern of DNC registration was almost identical across the eastern and western counties. In particular, registrations peaked on day 2, dropped on day 3, increased again on day 4, declined gradually until day 9, and increased slightly on days 18 and 25. These consistent patterns suggest that the consumers in counties immediately to the east and west of Mississippi had highly similar preferences for DNC registration. Hence, any differences in DNC registration before and after the first 10 days, and between the eastern and western counties, was likely the outcome of the exogenous difference in registration channel rather than unobserved consumer or county heterogeneities.
Model and Empirical Strategy
Generally, commercial and government services fall into two categories. One is services to arrange or reserve something else, for instance, to buy a DVD, to book airline travel, or arrange a driving test. The other category is where the service is the end-use itself, for instance, news, entertainment, or education. The DNC registry belongs to the former category -it helps consumers avoid telemarketing calls but otherwise does not provide any consumption benefit in itself. Once registered, consumers obtain identical benefit from the DNC service regardless of the means of registration.
Hence, ceteris paribus, any observed difference in DNC registration rates should be caused by the difference in the availability of registration channels. Referring to Figure 5 , let the population comprise three types of consumers: those who (i) value the DNC service and prefer to register through the Internet, (ii) value the DNC service and prefer to register by telephone, and (iii) do not value the DNC service. The behaviors of types (i) and (iii) consumers do not matter whether the tollfree line is provided. Type (ii) consumers, on the other hand, will be affected if the tollfree line is unavailable. Some of them may adapt to the Internet and still register, whereas some (those who "must use the telephone") will not register until the tollfree line becomes available.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
In the DNC context, between June 27 and July 6, 2003, all consumers could register through the Internet but only consumers in the West could register by tollfree call. From July 7 onward, all consumers could register through both the Internet and tollfree call.
Accordingly, relative to the western counties, we expect DNC registration to be lower in the eastern counties in the first 10 days (June 27 to July 6) and higher from day 11 (July 7) onward. Overall, the registration rate should be lower when the tollfree line was unavailable,
i.e., in the first 10 days in the eastern counties.
To identify whether any people would be left behind by a compulsory migration of services to the Internet (i.e., the existence of people who "must use the telephone" in Figure   5 ), we employed a difference-in-differences (DID) strategy by comparing the average DNC registration rates in the eastern counties in the first 10 days against the other time period and western counties. Effectively, the effect of compulsory migration ("Internet only") was identified in both cross-section (between western and eastern counties in the first 10 days) and within eastern counties (before and after day 10).
Econometrically, our basic model was a county-level DID model of the form:
where Q it was the DNC registration rate, calculated as the number of DNC registrations divided by the number of households, in county i on day t, I it was an indicator of having only
Internet registration in county i on day t (specifically, I it = 1 for counties in the east from June 27 to July 6, and I it = 0 otherwise),  i represented county specific effects,  t represented day specific effects, and  it captured any residual random errors.
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In all specifications, we clustered  it by county to control for any inter-temporal correlations in DNC registrations within counties. Together with the county effects,  i , and the day effects,  t , our analysis focused on explaining differences in registrations from county and daily averages, and, particularly, the incremental differences due to the compulsory migration to the Internet.
To buttress our identification of whether some people would be left behind, in another set of analyses, we added two terms:
where K it comprised variables -specifically, Internet and telephone penetrations and newspaper reports of the tollfree line -that a priori should be related to DNC registration or consumers' preferences for digital services. The interaction term, I it × ln K it , if significant, provided an additional identification strategy to pin down the cause of I it being significant. It should be due to having only Internet registration rather than other factors relevant to eastern counties in the first 10 days.
To estimate the number of people who would be left behind, i.e., the segment of consumers who "must use the telephone" (refer to Figure 5 ), we estimated another variant of the DID model:
where EAST i was an indicator denoting counties east of the Mississippi. The inclusion of EAST i × t allowed us to study the differences in DNC registration across the eastern and western counties on a daily basis. To impute the size of differences in DNC registration due to having only Internet registration, controlling for county and demographic characteristics, we employed the following procedure:
a. Estimated (3) Referring to Figure 5 , we could then sum up the differences in the first 10 days, and, also from day 11 onward, separately. This would give us two estimates of the segment size of people who "must use the telephone" -those who were left behind because DNC registration was available only on the Internet. Presumably, the sum of differences in the first 10 days should be negative (with only Internet registration, fewer people registered in the eastern counties in the first 10 days), whereas the sum from day 11 onward should be positive (pent-up demand among those who must use the telephone from the first 10 days would increase registration when the tollfree line became available).
Next, to identify who were left behind, we added two terms to (3):
where P i denoted demographic variables -income, age, education, social interaction, and
Internet penetration -that have variously been found to affect consumer adoption and use of digital services (e.g., DiMaggio et al. 2001; Agarwal et al. 2009 ). With this specification, the significance of the three-way interaction, EAST i × t ×P i , would then suggest that the differences in DNC registration in the eastern counties were correlated with P i , and so P i indirectly helped to identify the consumers who were left behind when the DNC registration was available only on the Internet.
Finally, to identify whether there was any long term impact of compulsory migration to the Internet, referring to model (3) and the procedure outlined thereafter, we compared the predicted differences in DNC registration in the eastern counties in the first 10 days against the differences recorded from day 11 onward. If the loss in the first 10 days exceeded the gain recorded from day 11 onward, then we would conclude that some consumers of the DNC registry were permanently "lost".
[Insert Figure 6 here] Referring to Figure 6 , an alternative experimental design -similar to the approach of past studies -would offer tollfree access to all consumers but offer Internet access to only the treatment group. This would identify people who need or prefer the Internet in accessing the service. As Jensen (2007) so aptly remarked, this alternative design actually addresses the digital provide.
Data
The FTC provided us with DNC registration data from the beginning of the registry in June 27, 2003. Prior to the opening of the federal DNC registry, 27 states had already established state-level DNC registries (FTC 2003a; Varian et al. 2004 ). From July 22 onward, some of these states added their lists to the federal registry. Since we could not identify which telephone numbers were registered directly by consumers and which were added from a state registry, we limited our analysis to registrations between June 27 and July 21. This provided a 25-day window of analysis.
The FTC records showed registrations by redacted telephone number for each area code and exchange, e.g., (617) 363-xxxx, by date of registration. 12 We matched the DNC registrations to the respective counties, and so identified the registrants' geographical location. 13 We then merged the registrations with various county-level data, including demographics from the U.S. Census 2000 and measures of newspaper reports of the DNC registry, weighted by the circulation in the county (Goh et al. 2011 ).
We organized the data-set, including registrations, consumer demographics, and newspaper reports, by county and day. For most analyses, we adopted a regression discontinuity design (Lee and Lemieux 2010) by focusing on the 109 counties immediately to the east and west of the Mississippi (the "border counties"). Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data for the east and west border counties, as well as the counties in the states immediately to the east and west of the Mississippi ("border states"). Evidently, the counties to the east and west of the Mississippi were very similar on most demographics. This facilitated our identification of the treatment, i.e., having only Internet registration in the eastern counties in the first 10 days.
[Insert Table 1 here] Table 2 reports correlations of the data in the border counties. In addition to the border states, in one robustness check, we expanded the analysis to the entire United States, which spanned 3,125 counties.
[Insert Table 2 here] 12 After the first 30 days, from July 27 onward, the FTC also recorded the means of registrationwhether by Internet or tollfree telephone. 13 We identified the counties served by each telephone exchange using the North American Local Exchange NPA-NXX Database. We matched the DNC registrations to counties because we could not identify the households who made the registrations. So, we could only use their geographical location -county -to identify their demographic characteristics. For telephone exchanges spanning multiple counties, we allocated the registrations to the respective counties based on the relative number of households as reported by the U.S. Census 2000. We excluded mobile phone registrations as U.S. mobile phone numbers are not associated with geographical location.
Were any people left behind?
Using ordinary least squares, we first regressed the daily registrations per household on the weighted number of newspaper reports of DNC per household and a complete set of county and day fixed effects in the sample of border counties. In all regressions, we specified DNC registrations per household and newspaper reports in logarithms. 14 For brevity, in the discussion below, we simply refer to the variable itself and omit mention of the logarithm.
As reported in Table 3 , column (1), the coefficient of newspaper reports of the DNC registry, 0.030 (± 0.022), was positive but not precisely estimated.
[Insert Table 3 here]
We next estimated model (1) including an indicator for having only Internet registration (= 1 in counties east of the Mississippi River from June 27 to July 6, and = 0 otherwise). This was a regression discontinuity test designed around the geographical break in the treatment. As reported in Table 3 , column (2), the coefficient of "Internet only", -0.659 (± 0.057), was negative and significant. In this specification, the coefficient of the weighted number of newspaper reports of the DNC registry, 0.038 (± 0.017), was positive and significant, suggesting that a 1% increase in reports was associated with a 0.038% increase in DNC registration.
The next two estimates progressively expanded the sample by geography -first to all of the counties in the border states, and then to the entire United States. The magnitude of the coefficient of "Internet only" was progressively smaller as the sample was expanded: -0.511 (± 0.018) among all counties in the border states (Table 3 , column (3)), and -0.454 (± 0.010) among all U.S. counties (Table 3 , column (4)). Apparently, the effect of having only Internet access (so lacking tollfree access) had the sharpest effect on the border. This would be 14 Empirical analyses often fit better with economic variables specified in logarithm (Wooldridge 2006, p. 197-200) .
consistent with people in coastal areas being relatively more Internet-savvy than people in the interior of the country.
The next two estimates progressively restricted the sample in time. Table 3 , column (5), reports an estimate on just the day before and the day on which tollfree registration became available in the east. This estimate was akin to a regression discontinuity test in time around the day of the treatment. The coefficient of "Internet only", -0.800 (± 0.085), was negative, significant, and larger in magnitude than the estimate covering days 1 to 25. These results provide formal support for Figure 3 , which shows that registrations surged on day 11, when tollfree registration became available in the east.
As we explain below, in the first few days, some consumers experienced difficulty with DNC registration through the Internet. So, the availability of tollfree in the west may have increased registration simply by providing an additional channel for registration. To check this explanation, our next specification included only data from day 6 to 25, after the problem with Internet registration was resolved. As reported in Table 3 , column (6), "Internet only" continued to be significant with a coefficient of -0.353 (± 0.059). However, the magnitude was substantially smaller than the estimate covering day 1 to 25, which is consistent with initial difficulties in registering through the Internet.
Additional Identification Strategies
To buttress our findings, we estimated model (2) by applying two identification strategies using heterogeneous effects. First, we included the interaction between "Internet only" and Internet access for only a minority of counties, and so, the sample was substantially reduced. 15 As reported in Table 3 , column (7), the coefficient of "Internet only", -0.746 (± 0.091), continued to be negative and significant. The data on telephone penetration were available only at the state level, and so the interaction variable would be subject to measurement error. With that proviso, we note that, consistent with a priori expectation, the interaction between "Internet only" and Internet penetration was positive and significant, whereas the interaction between "Internet only" and telephone penetration was negative and significant. These results lent strong support to our interpretation of the "Internet only"
variable as capturing the effect of the FTC implementation rather than other unobserved factors.
Next, many newspaper reports of the DNC also included the tollfree number, but these reports should have little impact when the Internet was the only means of registration.
16
As reported in Table 3 , column (8), the coefficient of "Internet only", -0.618 (± 0.056), was again negative and significant. Importantly for this identification strategy, the coefficient of news reports with the tollfree number, 0.182 (± 0.026) was positive and significant, but this positive effect was almost completely nullified when the reports were published in 15 We drew telephone lines per household at the state level from the Current Population Survey, Cell Phone Supplement, 2004 . The Survey did not report telephone access at the county level. 16 The FTC (2003b) emphasized in its publicity that people who preferred to register by telephone should simply wait 10 days. Eastern newspapers conveyed the message. For instance, on June 28, 2003, the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, OH) reported: "As long as consumers register by Aug. 31, their names will be included in the first release of the list to telemarketers. People in Ohio and other states east of the Mississippi also will be able to register by phone starting July 7." counties/periods with only Internet registration. The coefficient of the interaction between "Internet only" and news reports with the tollfree number was -0.177 (± 0.037), and so the net effect of news reports with the tollfree number in counties/periods with only Internet registration was merely 0.005, and not statistically significant (p = 0.91). Accordingly, news reports of the tollfree number affected registrations only when the tollfree line was available.
These results lent further support to our interpretation of the "Internet only" variable as capturing the effect of the FTC implementation rather than other unobserved factors.
Falsifications
Our results suggested that the compulsory use of the Internet was associated with a significant decrease in daily DNC registration. By definition, "Internet only" was one in states east of the Mississippi from June 27 to July 6, and zero otherwise. To further check our findings, we conducted a set of falsification tests, using other geographical boundaries and other effective dates. These served to check that DNC registration was influenced by the compulsory use of the Internet rather than some other county-or time-varying heterogeneity not properly controlled for. For brevity of presentation, we labeled all of the variables as placebos, with the meaning of the placebo defined in the respective column heading.
First, we constructed a new variable ("Placebo A") in a similar way as "Internet only", but with the border drawn between counties immediately east and west of the boundary between the Eastern/Central time zones. This falsification test was quite stringent as, referring to Figure 7 , the Eastern/Central time zone boundary is quite close to the Mississippi.
Nevertheless, using the same specification as the main estimate, as reported in Table 3 , column (9), Placebo A was insignificant.
[Insert Figure 7 here] Next, we constructed Placebo B with the border drawn between counties immediately east and west of the boundary between the Central/Mountain time zones. As reported in Table 3 , column (10), Placebo B was also insignificant.
We constructed Placebo C in a similar way as "Internet only", using the Mississippi as the geographical boundary, but with the effective date set as day 10 instead of day 11, and regressed daily registrations on Placebo C in the sub-sample of registrations in days 9 and 10 only. As reported in Table 3 , column (11), Placebo C was insignificant.
Finally, we constructed Placebo D with the effective date set as day 12 rather than day 11, and regressed daily registrations on Placebo D in the sub-sample of registrations in days 11 and 12 only. As reported in Table 3 , column (12), Placebo D was insignificant.
Overall, there was a significant and negative effect of "Internet only" on DNC registration only with the treatment defined geographically by the Mississippi River and in time by days 10/11. The falsification analyses lent strong support to the causal interpretation of the "Internet only" variable.
Alternative Explanations
One alternative explanation of the correlation between registrations and "Internet only" is a relation among consumers between impatience and preference for telephone service.
Suppose that people who are more impatient also prefer to register by telephone. Then, upon the opening of the DNC registry, the impatient people would rush to register and the registrations would be disproportionately by telephone, hence contributing to the lower registration rates in counties/periods with only Internet registration.
Although plausible, this alternative explanation is not consistent with the aggregate data. On July 1, 12% of telephone numbers were registered through tollfree call (FTC 2003c), whereas, by September 16, 25.9% were registered through tollfree call (FTC 2003d) . So, the proportion of telephone numbers registered by tollfree call more than doubled over eleven weeks. Evidently, it was the relatively patient consumers who preferred to register by tollfree call.
The differential impatience explanation is also inconsistent with the evidence in Figure 3 , which depicts the average daily registrations in the eastern border counties. Clearly, there was a jump in registrations on day 11 (July 7), when tollfree registration was opened to the east. If the impatient consumers preferred telephone service, there should have been no spike on day 11.
Yet another alternative explanation of the correlation between registrations and "Internet only" is the difficulties that consumers faced with Internet registration. Initially, the
DNC website was congested and Yahoo's mail server inadvertently classified the DNC confirmation emails as spam and routed them to Yahoo mail users' spam folders (Los Angeles Times, July 1, 2003). Western residents who encountered difficulty with Internet
registration could use the tollfree service. So, there would be a negative correlation between early registrations and the lack of tollfree registration.
Comparing our estimates for days 1 to 25 (Table 3 , column (2)) with the estimates for days 6 to 25 (Table 3 , column (6)), the estimated effect of "Internet only" was larger in the earlier period, which supports the Internet difficulty explanation. However, the Internet difficulties were resolved by day 5. Yahoo fixed the mail server problem on day 2 (it tuned its spam filter to recognize the DNC confirmation email as legitimate), and subsequently the FTC issued a news release explaining how to deal with online registration on July 1 (day 5).
So, the estimates for days 6 to 25 (Table 3 , column (6)) support that our interpretation of the effect in terms of the inability of some consumers to register through the Internet. Moreover, the Internet difficulty explanation cannot account for the positive impact of newspaper reports, as reported in Table 3 , column (2). Indeed, if limited registration capacity were the explanation, additional newspaper reports would simply add to congestion and have no significant effect on registration.
Further, the initial difficulties with Internet registration cannot account for the spike in registrations in eastern counties on day 11, upon the opening of tollfree registration in the east (Figure 3) . By day 10, the pace of registrations had declined sharply and there was no congestion at the DNC website or difficulties with Yahoo mail. Figure 3 is bolstered by the regression of daily registrations over days 10/11, as reported in Table 3 , column (5).
Evidently, the opening of tollfree registration in the east had a significant positive effect.
How many were left behind?
Having shown that the compulsory use of the Internet did affect DNC registrations, we now turn to identify the segment of people who "must use the telephone" (refer to Figure 5 ). This segment was affected because the service was available only on the Internet. We estimated model (3) by including the interactions between the indicator of counties to the east of the Mississippi and day dummy variables. To avoid data singularity, we used the last day in the sample, day 25, as control. Table 4 , column (1) reports the results.
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[Insert Table 4 here] Evidently, registrations were significantly lower in the first two days in the eastern border counties, when Internet registration was the only available option, but the disparity reversed from day 11, when the tollfree registration was opened. Following the procedure outlined in Section 4, specifically, model (3), steps (a) to (c), we imputed the daily losses/gains in DNC registrations in the eastern border counties. Presumably, controlling for all county and day fixed effects, and after the rigorous identification and robustness tests reported in Section 6, the difference in registrations between the eastern and western border counties should be attributed to the differential registration channels (Internet vis-à-vis tollfree line). Figure 8 plots the predicted differences in daily DNC registrations per household in the eastern border counties, along with the respective confidence intervals. The magnitudes and significance of the losses/gains were consistent with the coefficients reported in Table 4 , column (1). If we sum up the total losses in the first 10 days, the drop in daily registration due to not having the tollfree line was, on average, 0.031 (± 0.015) per household. The corresponding total gain from day 11 to 25 was 0.027 (± 0.012) per household. So, the size of the "must use the telephone" segment lay in the range [0.027, 0.031].
[Insert Figure 8 here]
To put this number in perspective, we also computed the hypothetical registration in the eastern border counties if both Internet and telephone registrations were available in the first 10 days (Section 4, model (3), step (b)). The hypothetical registration rate was 0.115 (± 0.056) per household. So, the maximum estimated "loss" due to not having tollfree access was 0.031 ÷ 0.115 = 27%. In other words, at most 27% of people were left behind when DNC registration was available only through the Internet but not the telephone.
In 2003, the average Internet penetration rate in the eastern border counties was around 61%, and so 39% of people lacked home Internet access. Supposing the rate of DNC registration via the Internet was proportional to the population with home Internet access, the loss in the eastern border counties would be around 39%. The estimated loss of at most 27% was consistent with the conjecture that some consumers were able to adapt to the Internet (see Figure 5 ), perhaps by asking others to register for them, or registering at their workplace, others' homes, or public facilities such as libraries.
Note that our estimate that 27% of people "must use the telephone" was an upper bound. The FTC had emphasized in its publicity and newspapers widely reported that tollfree registration would be available in the east from July 7. So, among the segment of consumers who preferred the telephone but who could adapt to the Internet, some might still choose to wait a few days and register by telephone.
Who were left behind?
To identify the profile of people who "must use the telephone", we estimated model (4).
Specifically, we focused on the three-way interaction between the indicator of counties to the east of the Mississippi, day dummy variables, and several demographic variables. The demographic variables would help us identify which groups of consumers were more affected by not being able to register by tollfree telephone service. Table 4 , columns (2) to (6), report the findings.
In general, income, education, and social interaction had no statistically significant impact. While the restriction to registration only through the Internet resulted in different registration patterns between eastern and western residents, the differences were not due to income, education, or social interaction. By contrast, age had a statistically significant impact on almost every day of observation. The higher the fraction of people who were aged 65 or above, the larger was the decrease in registration rate in the eastern counties in the first 10 days (the East × Day × % age 65 or above interactions were negative and significant for each of the first 10 days).
Further, age also tended to impede the subsequent recovery in registration after tollfree registration was made available. For example, from Table 4, In a further counterfactual exercise, we adopted a similar procedure as in Section 7 to quantify the net impact of the demographics. Specifically, we did the following:
i. Estimated (4) and obtained the predicted daily registrations in the eastern counties.
ii. Computed the hypothetical daily registrations in the eastern counties by adding one standard deviation of the corresponding demographic variable to the predicted values.
iii. Computed the difference between (i) and (ii) for each day. Table 5 reports the imputed changes in DNC registration rate due to the demographic changes for the first 10 days and the next 15 days in the eastern border counties. Adding one standard deviation (3%) of people aged 65 or above to the prevailing population would have reduced the registration rate by 0.021 per household in the first 10 days. This was a significant number because, as we reported in Section 7, the loss per household in the same period was only 0.031. Similarly, adding 3% of people aged 65 or above would have reduced the registration from day 11 onward by 0.011 per household. The total registration recorded in the same period was only 0.027. These findings indicate the importance of addressing the needs of senior citizens before cutting off conventional access to any service.
[Insert Table 5 here]
The second row of Table 5 reports the estimates for Internet penetration. Adding one standard deviation of Internet penetration (7%), to the prevailing population in the eastern border counties would have raised the registration rate by 0.022 per household in the first 10 days, but reduced the recovery in the next 15 days by 0.010. Apparently, a significant number of the people who "must use the telephone" were those who did not have Internet access. Internet access was indeed important in addressing the digital divide.
Long term impact
As reported in Section 7, the estimated total loss in the eastern border counties due to having only Internet registration in the first 10 days was 0.031 registration per household. The gain in the next 15 days, after the tollfree line was opened, was 0.027 registration per household.
The difference, 0.031 -0.027 = 0.004, was marginally significant (p = 0.078). As calculated above, the hypothetical registration in the eastern border counties if both Internet and telephone registrations were available in the first 10 days was 0.115 per household. So, the permanent loss of registration among those who must use the telephone but could not do so in the first 10 days was 0.004 ÷ 0.115 = 3.5%.
To corroborate this finding, we obtained additional data on the actual method of registration (Internet or tollfree) for each DNC registration from the FTC. 18 Such data were available only from July 27, 2003 onward, which was thirty days after the opening of the DNC registry. This was long after the tollfree line was opened to the eastern residents on July 7. So, there should not be a significant difference between the east and west in terms of the method of registration in this sample period.
To check, we regressed the daily DNC registrations through the Internet and by the tollfree line, and the ratio of Internet to total registrations on an indicator of counties to the east of the Mississippi and news reports of DNC as the control variable, using the sample July 27, 2003 to June 30, 2004 (about one year after the DNC registry was opened). Table 6 reports the estimation results. The indicator of counties to the east of the Mississippi did not have any significant influence on registration (whether through the Internet, by the tollfree line, or the ratio of Internet to total registrations). These results indicate that registrations did not pick up in the eastern border counties after the first month.
[Insert Table 6 here]
East was positive in Table 6 , column (2). Was this due to some of the "must use the Table 6 were significant.
The estimated total gain in the eastern border counties was only 0.0003 (± 0.0004) per household. It was statistically insignificant, and substantially smaller than the difference of 0.004 between the first 10 days and the next 15 days. Hence, even if some "must use the telephone" consumers registered after the first month, the total predicted registration in the east was still lower than the west.
Conclusions
Exploiting a natural experiment in the FTC's implementation of the DNC registry, we found robust evidence of a "digital divide". In the first 10 days, registrations were 0.031 per household or 27% lower among consumers in areas without tollfree telephone registration.
Once tollfree registration became available, the majority of the registrations lost in the first 10 days were recovered, but 0.004 per household or 3.5% were permanently lost. The loss of consumers was concentrated among the elderly and households lacking Internet access, and was not directly related to income, education, or social interaction. Our findings were confirmed through several identification strategies and robust to multiple falsification tests.
It is worth noting that, the DNC registry provided access through the Internet to all consumers from the beginning, but initially limited only the tollfree access. Accordingly, our experimental design specifically addressed the digital divide, and with respect to consumer outcomes. Interestingly, the proportion of consumers who were "left behind", 27%, was less than the proportion that lacked home Internet access, 39%. Apparently, some were able to adapt and gain access to the Internet through other ways. This finding suggests that policymakers, managers, and scholars need not be so pessimistic about the digital divide. Focusing on Internet penetration and usage might over-state the impact of the divide. In the DNC context, some of the people who were "digitally deprived" could adapt, and did so, even for very small stakes (they gained nothing by registering early). For larger stakes, they would surely work harder to adapt to the lack of conventional access.
For public policy and management practice, an important direction for future research is how to manage the segment of consumers who must use conventional service. One choice is simply to cut them off, as the state of Florida did with applications for unemployment
benefit. An alternative is to provide conventional access selectively -targeting conventional access to that segment without drawing in consumers who prefer or could adapt to Internet service. The challenge is how to implement the self-selection. Lufthansa offers lower fares for online booking (an incentive) and charges a premium for telephone booking in the U.K. (a disincentive). Another way is to limit the service capacity for conventional channels, which would naturally induce a delay in service time.
We found that the digital divide was concentrated among the elderly. Hence, the impact of a complete migration of service to the Internet (combined with discontinuation of conventional access) would be larger for goods and services that are relatively more important for senior citizens such as healthcare and retirement finances. (2)-(6) included interaction of day dummy variables with the demographic variables specified in the column headings, which are not reported for brevity. Column (1): Interaction of East with day dummy variable; Column (2): Including the interaction of median household income with day dummy variables, and the interaction of median household income with East and day dummy variables; Column (3): Including the interaction of % age 65 or above with day dummy variables, and the interaction of % age 65 or above with East and day dummy variables; Column (4): Including the interaction of % high school education or above with day dummy variables, and the interaction of % high school education or above with East and day dummy variables; Column (5): Including the interaction of social interaction with day dummy variables, and the interaction of social interaction with East and day dummy variables; Column (6): Including the interaction of % Internet penetration with day dummy variables, and the interaction of % Internet penetration with East and day dummy variables. Robust standard errors clustered by county in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
